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ABSTRACT 
Any child support regime necessarily makes policy choices about how parental income should be 
shared between the two parental households. Those choices involve balancing the claims of the 
child, the claims of the custodial parent for help with the expense of providing for the child, and 
the claims of the support obligor for autonomy in deciding how to spend his own earnings. That 
balancing task is complicated by the fact that the child and the custodial parent necessarily share 
a living standard, so that any child support transfer, large or small, will unavoidably benefit the 
custodial parent as well as the child. This article reports the findings of an empirical study 
designed to reveal how the British public believe this balance should be struck. It then compares 
the public’s preferred policies to the policy choices implicit in the current UK child support 
schedule. It concludes that there are important gaps between the two, and recommends that 
consideration be given to amending the current UK law to better align it with the public’s values 
on these matters. 1§ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Successive British governments have tried different approaches to ensure that non-resident 
parents fulfil their child support obligations. With the establishment of the Child Support Agency 
(CSA) in 1993, responsibility for both setting required child support amounts, and enforcing the 
requirement, was taken from the courts in almost all cases. Parents with care (resident parents) 
receiving means-tested state benefits were obliged to use the CSA’s services, unless able to show 
a ‘good cause’ not to do so, and the state recouped the amount of their benefits from the support 
paid. Other parents could use the CSA, make a private arrangement between them, or do nothing 
(by design or default).1 
Despite repeated attempts to improve the CSA’s efficiency, including by substantial 
simplification of the formula for calculating child support liability in 2003, the CSA failed to 
ensure that all, or even most, fathers met their child support obligations. A large-scale 
administrative overhaul of the system between 2006 and 2009 and a reduced caseload (resulting 
from the 2008 repeal of the requirement that mothers on means-tested benefits use the CSA), 
produced some improvements in the CSA’s performance.2 By 2006, and arguably well before, 
there was widespread recognition that the CSA was a failed institution and that major change was 
needed.3 The Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act 2008 created a new statutory child 
support scheme, run by a new body to replace the CSA. Various changes – outlined below – were 
made with a view to making the system easier and more cost-effective to operate. The Coalition 
Government largely inherited this programme for change, which it started to roll-out on a very 
limited basis for new applicants from December 2012. Completion (when all cases will be run by 
a new ‘Child Maintenance Service’) is expected to be in 2017.  
The current statutory formula for calculating child support, applicable to most existing 
cases, has been used since 2003. It achieved simplicity in part by eliminating consideration of the 
mother’s income.4 Child support is instead set at a percentage of the father’s net income that 
varies only with the number of children, without regard to the mother’s income: 15 per cent for 
one child, 20 per cent for two children, and 25 per cent for three or more children. A downward 
adjustment is made when the father or his current partner have other dependent children. The 
support obligation is also reduced if the children stay with the father at least 52 nights each year. 
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The 2003 formula also eliminated consideration of the income of either parent’s new partner, 
which the earlier formula had taken into account, although not in entirely transparent ways. In 
due course the revised system will be simplified further by basing the calculation on the father’s 
gross taxable5 income from the previous tax year, rather than on his net income for the current 
year. This will enable the father’s relevant income to be established by reference to the past 
year’s tax return, potentially easing the difficulties of proving income in some complex cases, 
such as those involving self-employed fathers. There is no intention to alter the schedule in 
substance, however, as the percentages applied to the gross income will be adjusted so as to 
produce support amounts roughly comparable to those now required.6 
The main administrative changes now being implemented by the Coalition Government 
aim to move parents to make their own ‘family-based arrangements’ rather than use the statutory 
system. Based on recommendations from Sir David Henshaw’s 2006 report,7 mothers will be 
charged an upfront fee (£20) for invoking the statutory child support service, and both parents 
(but especially the father, with a 20 per cent fee) will be charged significant ongoing fees if the 
government collects support payments. Even parents willing to pay for use of the statutory 
system will not have access to it without first participating in a conversation with a government-
funded body, the Child Maintenance Options Service, intended to help them make family-based 
arrangements.  
We previously reported that the planned move away from government setting and 
enforcing child support obligations appears contrary to the views of the British public, as 
revealed in attitude questions we put in the 2012 British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey (Bryson, 
Ellman, McKay and Miles, 2014). But knowing only that the public supports government 
enforcement of child support leaves crucial questions unanswered: how much support do they 
believe the government should require of non-resident parents, and what principles do they 
believe should apply in setting that amount? Our earlier article shed some light on these questions 
by summarizing some results from other questions we also put on that BSA survey. In these 
questions, respondents were asked to state the child support amount they would require in 
particular cases put to them. This article provides a much fuller examination of those data. We 
ask whether the public’s answers establish their endorsement of any particular principles for 
setting support amounts, and if so, whether the public’s views are consistent with the current UK 
statutory formula. Not surprisingly, there is no clear public consensus about the precise support 
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amount, in pounds, the government should require in any particular case. Yet it is equally clear 
from the data that there are basic principles for setting that amount that enjoy wide public 
support, and, as we explain below, the method current UK law uses to set support amounts is 
inconsistent with those principles. We therefore conclude that a re-examination of the current 
law’s rationale is in order.  
   
II. METHOD 
 
1. What Survey Respondents Were Asked 
 
This study presented a series of cases (vignettes) in face-to-face interviews with individuals in a 
large representative sample of the British population. The method was based on an approach used 
by one of the authors in a successful series of studies in the United States (Ellman, Braver and 
MacCoun, 2009; Braver, Ellman, and MacCoun, 2014). British survey respondents were asked to 
imagine that they were responsible for setting the amount of child support the law should require 
the father to pay the mother in each of the cases. They were told to state the amount they believed 
the law ‘should’ require. They were not asked to guess what the law in fact requires. They were 
told there was ‘no right or wrong answer’ because we just ‘want to know what you think’, and 
they were not asked to explain their answers. They were thus free to apply whatever unarticulated 
principles they saw fit. The complete text of the basic question is set out in the box below.  
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Text of Question on Child Support Judgements. 
Usually when parents don't live together, their children live mainly with one parent. By 
law, the other parent should pay child maintenance to the parent with whom the child lives most 
of the time. But the question is how much maintenance the law should require the other parent to 
pay. There are no right or wrong answers on this. We want to know what you think the law 
should require. 
I'm going to tell you about several different situations, and ask you to imagine that you 
are the person who has to decide how much maintenance the law should require the parent to pay 
in each case. We want you to tell us what you think the amount should be. 
I want you to imagine a family in which - 
There is one child, an 8 year old boy; 
His parents were married for 10 years, but are now divorced; 
He lives mostly with his mother, but sees his father twice a week after school, and usually 
stays with his father overnight once at the weekend.  
 
This text remained unchanged across the cases, and thus for every case the parents were 
divorcing after ten years of marriage, and had one child, an eight year old boy, who now lives 
primarily with mother but sees father on the indicated schedule. What did vary across the cases 
were the parents’ incomes. There were three variants of the father’s ‘net monthly income’8 
(£1,000, £2,000 or £3,000 a month) and three of the mother’s (£900, £1,500, or £2,200).9 There 
were thus nine (3 x 3) possible income combinations, and thus nine possible cases. Every 
respondent was asked to state in pounds the monthly amount of child support they would require 
the law to set in each of the nine cases. Respondents could consult their answer for a prior case, if 
they wished, before responding to a later case. They were free to propose amounts that varied, or 
did not vary, from vignette to vignette. Pilot studies for the American work found that 
respondents’ answers were affected by the sequence in which the income-combinations were 
given; we therefore adopted the American approach and presented the cases in four different 
counterbalanced orders that were randomly employed among respondents. All results reported in 
this article are aggregated across these four orders.10  As a control device, a different and smaller 
group of respondents was presented with a set of questions identical to those we report on here, 
but for one change in the wording: instead of being asked what they thought the law should 
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require the father to pay, this group was asked to state the amount they believed it was fair for 
the father to pay.11   
 
 
2. The Sample 
 
Our questions formed one of six substantive modules in the 2012 British Social Attitudes Survey 
(BSA).12 This high quality, representative sample survey has been conducted by NatCen Social 
Research in most years since 1983.13 While the authors were responsible for constructing the 
questions in their module, they worked in consultation with NatCen to ensure that the module 
could be administered effectively by the NatCen interviewers, and the team made some 
adjustments to the module following pilot studies conducted by NatCen. 
The BSA survey series puts questions to a large representative sample of British adults 
aged 18+. Since 1993, the sampling frame for the survey has been the Postcode Address File 
(PAF), which is a list of addresses (or postal delivery points) compiled by the Post Office. The 
sampling method is a multi-stage design, with three separate stages of selection: postcode sector 
(e.g. ‘B15 2’), address, and individual, with one individual selected at each address. The structure 
of the questionnaire plus further technical details of the survey series can be found at 
www.natcen.ac.uk/bsa.  
Interviewing for the 2012 BSA mainly took place between June and September of that 
year, with a small number of interviews in October and November. Fieldwork was conducted by 
interviewers drawn from NatCen’s regular panel, using face-to-face computer-assisted personal 
interviewing (CAPI). Some BSA questions are included in a pen and paper self-completion 
section, fielded in addition to the main interview, but this article reports on questions that were 
part of the face-to-face survey. There were 2,984 interviews putting the question set forth in the 
box above, albeit with item-missing data on particular questions (mostly low levels).14 The 
overall survey response rate was 53 per cent. The sampling weights for BSA correct for the 
unequal selection of addresses, dwelling units and individuals. There is also correction for biases 
caused by differential non-response with the final non-response weight designed so that the 
weighted sample matches the population in terms of age, sex and region. A technical section on 
the BSA website provides further details for the 2012 survey in particular (http://www.bsa-
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30.natcen.ac.uk/read-the-report/technical-details.aspx). However, in general terms we can expect 
that the achieved sample, suitably weighted, is a good representation of the population aged 18+ 
in Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland). 
 
 
III. RESULTS 
We reported our respondents’ mean child support amounts, and their distribution, in Bryson et al. 
(2013). We first briefly review and expand upon that data here, and then employ statistical 
modelling techniques to enable us to obtain a deeper understanding of respondents’ beliefs. 
 
1. Means and variability in child support amounts 
Figure 1 displays the mean monthly child support amounts our respondents believed the law 
should require the father to pay for each of the nine cases put to them. There is a separate line for 
each of the three maternal incomes. The father’s income is on the horizontal axis, with child 
support amounts on the vertical axis. The data markers show the mean amount specified for each 
of the nine combinations of mother’s and father’s income. A line joining the markers for each 
maternal income helps reveal the response pattern. A fourth line indicates the support amount 
currently set for these same nine cases by the child support legislation under the CSA 2003 
system. One line is sufficient because the legislative schedule does not vary with maternal 
incomes. 
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Figure 1  Mean monthly child support amount favoured by respondents for different levels 
of net monthly parental income, and statutory (CSA 2003 system) amounts 
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This figure reveals four key points about the public’s beliefs. First, they believe the 
mother’s income matters. If they thought it did not matter, their views would display as one line 
instead of three, because the three lines would be on top of one another. Because they are not on 
top of each other we know the public believes thinks support amounts should vary with maternal 
income.15 Second, the fact that all three lines rise as they move to the right shows the public 
believes fathers who earn more should pay more child support. Whilst this might seem obvious, 
closer examination reveals a more subtle point: the lines also ‘fan out’ as the father’s income 
increases, because the slope of the lines is steeper for cases in which the mother’s income is 
lower. That shows the public believes the father’s obligation should increase more rapidly with 
his income when the mother’s income is lower. For example, when the mother earns £2,200 a 
month, our respondents require fathers to pay an additional £18 for each additional £100 of their 
income, but they require fathers to pay £23 per additional £100 of their income when the 
mother’s earns £1,500 a month, and £28 per £100 when she earns only £900. Finally, and third, it 
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appears the public does not believe the function of child support is limited to lifting children out 
of poverty, because they would require maintenance payments to keep rising with the father’s 
income beyond the point at which poverty would be alleviated. The difference between the 
maintenance they would require of the father earning £2,000 and the higher amount they would 
require of the father earning £3,000 suggests they think the higher-income father should help pay 
for some amenities in the mother’s household, not just necessities.16 These same three features 
were also found in the pattern of responses in the American studies, and were summarized as the 
data’s ‘fanning line pattern’ because the three lines all rise but also fan out (Ellman, Braver and 
MacCoun, 2014). We adopt that label here.   
The fourth point that is also evident from Figure 1 is that for eight of the nine cases put to 
them, the public would require fathers to pay higher amounts than called for in the CSA 
schedule.17 The only exception is the case combining the lowest paternal income with the highest 
maternal income, for which the mean preference of the public is essentially identical to the CSA 
schedule. The exception, however, is actually an example of a consistent pattern: the gap between 
the public’s view and current UK law increases when the father’s income is higher, or the 
mother’s income is lower. That increase in the gap is visually apparent in Figure 1. The 
difference at lower maternal incomes follows, of course, from the fact that the CSA schedule 
applies a flat percentage to paternal income that is the same for all maternal incomes, while our 
respondents would require fathers to pay a higher percentage of their income in child support 
when maternal incomes are lower. 
Figure 2 is identical to Figure 1 except that our respondents’ mean child support 
judgments for the nine income combinations are shown as a percentage of the father’s income, 
rather than in pounds. Plotting the judgments as a percentage helps in comparing them to 
legislation, whether in the UK or elsewhere, that sets the presumptively correct support judgment 
as a percentage of parental income. The black horizontal line shows the percentage of income 
payable under the CSA schedule; as in Figure 1, a single line is sufficient because the law applies 
the same percentage no matter what the mother’s income is, and the line is horizontal because the 
percentage does not vary with the father’s income (within this income range18). It is clear from 
this figure that, on average, the British public disagrees with both these UK rules. Not only does 
the public favour raising the percentage applied to the father’s income when the mother’s income 
is lower, but they also prefer a progressive rate structure that increases the percentage of the 
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father’s income devoted to child support as his income increases. The upward slopes of the three 
data lines in Figure 2 show this, even though they are not steep. The point is made more clearly 
in Figure 3, which also plots support amounts as a percentage of the father’s income. In Figure 3, 
however, each line represents a different paternal income, with maternal incomes indicated on 
the horizontal axis. Figure 3 thus shows how support varies with the mother’s income, for any 
given paternal income. The downward slope reflects the public’s view that the percentage should 
decline as the mother’s income increases. The distance between the three sloping lines in Figure 
3 reflects the public’s preference for percentages that are higher for higher-income fathers.  
 
Figure 2 Child support judgments as per cent of net monthly father income, for three 
different net monthly incomes of mother. 
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Figure 3 Child support judgments as per cent of father income (all incomes net 
monthly) 
 
 
 
To this point we have focused on the average support amounts, but we also want to know 
how our respondents’ judgments vary around the average. Table 1 shows, for all nine income 
combinations, the support amounts favoured by respondents at the 25th and 75th percentile, as 
well as the median (50th percentile). So, where the father had an income of £1,000 and the mother 
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Table 1 Monthly child Support Judgements at differing points of the distribution and 
CSA amounts based on parental monthly incomes 
Father’s 
Income  
£1,000 £2,000 £3,000 
Mother’s 
Income 
CSA 25th 50th 75th CSA 25th 50th 75th CSA 25th  50th 75th 
£900 129 100 200 250 257 250 400 600 386 400 700 1000 
£1,500 129 50 100 200 257 200 300 500 386 300 500 800 
£2,200 129 10 100 200 257 100 200 400 386 200 400 600 
 
The overall pattern, however, is easier to see in Figure 4, which is like Figure 1 except 
that it plots the support amounts favoured by those whose child support judgments put them in 
the highest and lowest quartile, rather than the mean support amounts. The heavy black line lying 
at about the middle of the other six lines is the CSA amount. 
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Figure 4. Mean child support judgments for respondents in the Upper and Lower 
quartiles (25/75), for each combination of net monthly parental incomes, and CSA amount.  
 
 
One can see that the support amounts favoured by the upper quartile are generally higher than the 
CSA amounts, and the divergence increases at higher father incomes. On the other hand, amounts 
favoured by the lower quartile fall at or below the CSA benchmark. So it seems there is 
considerable variability in the absolute support levels our respondents favour. Yet at the same 
time, the fanning line pattern shown in Figure 1 is also present in the responses of both the upper 
and lower quartiles. That is visually more apparent for the upper quartile because the slopes of 
those three lines are steeper than for the lower quartile responses, making it more obvious that 
their judgments grow further apart as father income rises. But that same pattern is also there for 
the lower quartile responses: the lines are closer together when father income is £1000 than when 
it is £3000. So even respondents in the lower quartile not only favour support amounts that are 
higher when the mother’s income is lower, they also favour increasing support amounts more 
rapidly, with the father’s income, when the mother’s income is lower. For example, they would 
increase support amounts by £150 for each £1000 increase in paternal income, when maternal 
income is £900, but only by £95 per £1000 of paternal income, when maternal income is £2,200. 
£0
£200
£400
£600
£800
£1,000
£1,200
£1,000 £2,000 £3,000
Ch
ild
 su
pp
or
t j
ud
ge
m
en
t 
Income of Father 
£900 upper-25%
£1,500 upper-25%
£2,200 upper-25%
CSA
£900 lower-25%
£1,500 lower-25%
£2,200 lower-25%
Income of mother, 
and respondent 
quartile 
 15 
Because of the steeper slopes generally, the equivalent amounts are further apart for the upper 
quartile–-£375 and £200—but a key point is that one gets the fanning line pattern in both  groups. 
 
1. Developing a statistical model for the data.  
Generalizations about the public’s views based only on the raw data presented thus far 
necessarily leave some important questions unanswered.  That is because we obviously cannot 
present our questions to every member of the public, nor can we ask about everything that may 
affect their answers. We thus do not know the extent to which the answers we got depended on 
facts we did not ask about, and we do not know whether we might get different answers had we 
asked a different sample of the public. Moreover, the raw data cannot tell us much about how a 
particular respondent’s characteristics affect that respondent’s judgments in the cases—did it 
matter whether a respondent was a Conservative, or a woman, or a university graduate? 
Statistical models of the raw data can shed considerable light on all these questions. We provide 
an explanation of our methods in the boxed text below, cast in terms we hope is accessible to 
readers unfamiliar with statistical analysis.  Readers who prefer to take us on faith may skip it. 
 
  
The basic technique builds a model of the data using equations that set the dependent 
variable (here, the child support amount) as a function of the independent variables we 
investigated (here, the two parental incomes), adding an “error term” reflecting unexplained 
variation in the dependent variables that result from random fluctuation or from variables we 
did not ask about. Each independent variable in the equation is multiplied by its “coefficient”. 
The analysis looks for coefficients that (in this case) give equations predicting a child support 
amount, for any combination of parental incomes, that come closest to the mean amount our 
respondents in fact chose for that case. Visually, we can use that equation to plot a line 
produced by the predicted support amounts for the cases, and we want the equation that 
produces the “best fit” line—the line that comes closest to the line created by plotting the 
actual data points for the nine cases put. 
Such equations typically also have a “constant” term. In our case, imagine that we have 
a coefficient for each of the parental incomes, which tells us how much the predicted support 
amount (the amount predicted by our equation) varies as either parental income changes.  But 
varies from what?  One must have a starting point from which to adjust the support amount as 
either parent’s income goes up or down.  This is a constant because that starting point does not 
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  change from case to case—the predicted support amount changes only because of changes in the 
value of the parental incomes.   
A regression equation built the way we have just described would look like this: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 =  𝑏0  + 𝑏1𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 + 𝑏2𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖  +  𝑃𝑖𝑖   (1) 
 
What this says is that the child support judgment (CSJ) made by any particular individual 
respondent, i, for any given case (j) from among the 9 income combinations, is equal to a constant 
amount (𝑏0) plus the PWC’s income in case j (𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖), multiplied by the coefficient for 
the PWC income (𝑏1), added to the value of the NRP’s income in that case multiplied by its 
coefficient (𝑏2𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖), plus the error term (𝑃𝑖𝑖).  Now of course, at this point in the 
process, we are not making distinctions among the individual respondents, so the child support 
amount being predicted is the mean amount, for each of the nine cases, across all respondents. 
Thus, one i will be no different than another.  Later on, we report the results of a Level 2 analysis 
in which we do distinguish among individual respondents, by their answers to the demographic 
questions we asked.  That is the method by which we ascertain, for example, whether men and 
women, or members of different political parties, answer the questions differently, and if so, in 
what ways. But before we get to that point, we must complete the basic Level 1 equation, for 
what we have above is not quite finished.  
Finishing involves finding the values for the coefficients in the equation—the values that 
produce predicted support amounts for each case that are the closest to the actual mean values in 
the data (the “best fit” line).  One can do that for Equation 1 as it is set out, and we did, but the 
best fit line still does not fit very well.  If one were to reproduce Figure 1, but with Equation 1’s 
predicted values rather than the actual means, the problem becomes obvious: the three lines (one 
for each maternal income) in this alternative version of Figure 1 do not fan out. They are parallel 
to one another. That is because the change in the support amount Equation 1 returns, for any 
given change in NRP’s income, is the same no matter the PWC’s income. One can see this from 
just inspecting the equation itself: the effect of any change in NRP income on the calculation of 
〖CSJ〗ij depends on the coefficient for NRP income, and nothing else—and certainly not the PWC 
income. Under Equation (1), changes in PWC income certainly affect the predicted support 
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  amount, but only directly—they have no impact on the role that changes in NRP income have, as 
they do in the actual data. In statistical terms, what we need is a term in the regression equation 
for the “interaction” of the two parental incomes, in addition to the “main effect” that each 
parental income also has on its own. We must thus add an ‘interaction term’ to the formula. That 
term, (𝑏3(𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖)), consists of the two incomes in case j multiplied by one another, 
and by its own coefficient, 𝑏3. Adding this interaction term to Equation (1) produces Equation (2): 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 + 𝑏2𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖  + 𝑏3(𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖)  + 𝑃𝑖𝑖   (2) 
 
Introducing this interaction term allows for the possibility that the slopes of the three lines 
(one line for each PWC income) are not parallel. The next step is to estimate the values for the 
coefficients, the constant, and the error term in this equation. There are various methods for doing 
this. We employ a modelling approach that readers familiar with statistical analysis know as 
‘hierarchical linear modelling’, or HLM (Raudenbusch and Bryk, 2002). We make this choice 
because of the structure of our data: we wish to analyse how responses vary across the nine cases 
presented to each individual, but we also wish to make comparisons across individuals. This 
method allows one to compute essential statistics for data structured in this manner. Table 2 
shows the results from this analysis of Equations (1) (without the interaction term) and (2) (with 
the interaction term). Figure 5 reproduces Figure 1, but using the values predicted by Equation (2) 
(the “fitted” values or amounts) rather than the raw means. One can see from the Table 2 that all 
the values, including the interaction term, are highly significant. (One tests for significance by 
identifying the probability that the result would arise from chance or random fluctuation.  The 
smaller the probability, the more significant is the result.  The column labelled “significance” in 
this table shows that the probability is zero through the third place after the decimal—a highly 
significant result.) One can see Figure 5 reproduces the fanning line pattern of Figure 1. We thus 
see that the model captures the raw data quite well. (The very sharp-eyed, or those with rulers, 
might have noticed that the data points in Figure 1 do not fall precisely on a straight line. In fact, 
quadratic terms were also statistically significant, but quite marginally so. They would have added 
considerably to the complexity of the model without providing much additional accuracy, and we 
therefore chose to proceed with the linear terms shown here.) 
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We now go on to examine the insights into the data that the model reveals. Applying the 
HLM analysis explained in the boxed text yielded equations with the values set out in Table 2. 
Our focus is on the second equation. The table sets out the coefficients for each term in the 
model: the Intercept (sometimes called the Y-Intercept or constant term), the two parental 
incomes, and the interaction term in the equation which captures the fact that the effect of father’s 
income on the child support amount depends in part of the level of the mother’s income. The 
significance level, which is zero to three decimal places, tells us that the model fits the data very 
well. Figure 5 is the equivalent of Figure 1, but using the model’s fitted values rather than the raw 
mean values.   
 
 
Table 2 Child Support Judgements based on parental incomes (HLM) – basic model, 
with and without interaction term on incomes 
     Variable  Coefficient Standard error z-statistic Significance 
          Equation 1     
Intercept 132.2917 6.389 20.78 0.000 
PWC (Mother) income -134.9099 2.389 -56.46 0.000 
NRP (Father) income 220.494 1.555 141.83 0.000 
          Equation 2     
Intercept -110.44 10.844 -10.19 0.000 
PWC (Mother) income 23.72 6.206 3.82 0.000 
NRP (Father) income 342.11 4.662 73.39 0.000 
Interaction 
(MotherIncome*FatherIncome) 
-79.32 2.873 -27.61 0.000 
     N = 22,725 observations from 2,525 individuals (complete cases). 
Models run in Stata v11.2’s xtmixed. 
 
 19 
Figure 5 Child support judgments as estimated from HLM Equation (2) 
 
 
 
2. Stability of the results 
 
How stable are our results?  Figure 4 showed a considerable difference between the mean support 
amounts given by those in the highest and lowest quartiles. One would expect such variability in 
the answers to any question for which respondents have a limited frame of reference. Imagine, for 
example, asking a random sample of the public to estimate the cost of a bottle of a particular 
vintage of French burgundy from a particular vintner. The task given to our respondents surely 
involved matters that are more familiar to most of them, but one would still expect considerable 
variability. However, our repeated measures design – with nine responses for each respondent 
across the income variations – allows us to probe the relationship among the nine judgments 
given by any single respondent. That is one way of getting at the effect of the parental income 
alone on their judgment, once everything else is controlled for. Are the repeated judgments of 
each respondent also highly variable, or are they stably related to one another?  
One way of answering this question is to calculate a simple correlation between any given 
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by a respondent was r = 0.72, and between the second and the third, it was r = 0.83.19 One can 
thus be much more accurate in predicting a respondent’s judgment for any particular case once 
one knows that respondent’s judgment in a prior case. (In statistical terms, for those with the 
relevant background, knowing the respondent’s first judgment lowers the standard error of 
estimate for the second judgment to 48 percent of its former value.) This suggests there is a 
coherent pattern to each individual’s set of nine judgments, even if one individual’s nine 
judgments are different from another’s. The nine judgments are not random ‘stabs in dark’ but 
seem instead to reflect a thoughtfully constructed system for taking account of parental income. 
A second way of examining the stability of the results is to compare the variability in the 
slope of the individual regression lines in Figure 5, to the variability in their Y-intercepts. The Y-
intercept—the value of the child support amount for the point at which the line would cross the 
vertical (Y) axis if it were extended—is determined by the value of the constant. It is usually 
referred to, as in Table 2, as simply the Intercept. The slope is determined by the coefficients for 
the parental income terms. The variability in all these terms is measured by their standard errors, 
and the third column of Table 2 shows that the standard errors for the income coefficients in 
Equation (2) are about half the size of the standard error for the Intercept. That means there is 
more variability in our respondents’ choice of support amount in any single case than in how they 
adjust their initial answer in response to changes in parental income in subsequent cases (their 
own individual regression line slopes). Put another way, respondent A and respondent B might 
award very different support amounts in each case they consider – A may be more generous than 
B overall, so that A’s responses would be plotted higher up a chart like figure 1 than B’s – but the 
way that they each adjust their individual responses from case to case – and so the overall pattern 
of their responses – will be quite similar. Our respondents are remarkably consistent with one 
another in deciding the effect that any given change in either parent’s income should have on the 
child support amount, even when they start with different amounts in the first case put to them.20 
It is of course the way in which one adjusts support amounts in response to parental income 
changes that produces the fanning line pattern. This analysis thus confirms the visual impression 
conveyed by Figure 4, which showed that the support amounts favoured by those at both the 
upper and lower quartiles also form a fanning line pattern. This relative consistency with which 
the public favours this pattern is important because the pattern has policy implications, as we 
point out in the final section of this article. 
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A third question is whether these results are likely to be replicated if the questions were 
put to a new sample of the public. The small size of the standard errors for all the terms in the 
equation tells us to expect a new sample would produce raw values close to those in this sample. 
The particularly small standard error for the coefficients for both the father income and the 
income-interaction term tells us the slopes of the lines in Figures 1 and 5 are unlikely to be very 
different, and the similarly small standard error for the coefficients of mother income and the 
interaction term means that the distance between the lines should also change very little across 
samples. The somewhat larger standard error for the Intercept means the height of the lines will 
vary more across samples, but whatever the height, the fanning line pattern persists. The stability 
of the fanning line pattern is also suggested by the fact that it is found within each of the 
demographic subgroups in our sample that we considered: age, gender, income, housing tenure, 
educational qualifications, and political affiliation. Some groups preferred slightly higher or 
lower support amounts, in general, than other groups, but all favoured the fanning line pattern.  
Further explanation of our findings about these demographic variables is presented in the next 
section. 
 
 
3. Differences among demographic subgroups 
One might wonder whether there were systematic differences in the child support judgments of 
different groups of respondents. The BSA survey included demographic information on the 
respondents, and we investigated seven attributes that one might expect to affect their child 
support judgments:  
Age – are there systematic differences between the amounts favoured by older and 
younger respondents?  
Gender and presence of children – do men and women set different amounts? Did having 
children of dependent age in the household make any difference? 
Experience of child support system – are responses affected by the respondent’s current or 
prior status as a payer or recipient of child support? This attribute is obviously very likely to 
overlap with gender. 
Income – household income deciles. 
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Housing tenure –in the UK, housing tenure is a reasonably good (and enduring) proxy for 
social position. 
Educational qualifications. We compare those with degrees, to those without such  
qualifications. 
Political affiliations. We consider if identifying with any of the main political parties 
affects child support judgments. 
 
As explained in the boxed text, we employed Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM) to 
investigate this question, as this technique allows one to ask how within-subject variations (here, 
the changes in each respondent’s support amounts across the nine income combinations), are 
affected by differences between subjects, such as their demographic characteristics. Each 
respondent’s child support judgments in the nine cases are represented by the Level 1 equations 
set out in the box above; the respondents’ varying demographic characteristics are added through 
Level 2 equations. This method allows us to ask whether these demographic characteristics affect 
either the absolute amount of the individual’s support judgments (i.e., the Intercept, or height of 
the lines on the graph) or the way in which those judgments change with parental incomes (the 
slope of the lines on the graphs).  
The results are shown in Table 3. The second column shows the Level 2 coefficients for 
each of the tested demographic characteristics; those with asterisks are statistically significant, 
with the significance level shown in the last column. Consider gender first. The simple 
descriptive analysis offered in our earlier article (Bryson et al. 2013) detected no difference in the 
responses of men and women, but the HLM analysis shows there is in fact a small but significant 
£20 increment in the support amounts favoured by women over those favoured by men. (This 
follows from the fact that the coefficient for “female” is 19.968, which we round to 20.) Plotting 
the  
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Table 3 Child Support Judgements based on parental incomes (HLM two level 
regression) – main model. 
     Variable  Coefficient Standard error z-statistic Significance 
          Level 1 variables     
Intercept -59.45* 26.078 -2.28 0.023 
PWC (Mother) income 23.73*** 6.206 3.82 0.000 
NRP (Father) income 342.11*** 4.662 73.39 0.000 
PWCInc*NRPInc -79.32*** 2.873 -27.61 0.000 
     Level 2 variables     
Female 19.698* 8.524 2.31 0.021 
Ever received child support. -39.09** 13.478 -2.9 0.004 
Highest qual (ref=graduate)     
Other quals -60.317*** 11.578 -5.21 0 
None -82.34*** 14.443 -5.7 0 
Political affiliation (ref=Lib 
Dem)     
Conservative 17.427 18.46808 0.94 0.345 
Labour 8.066 18.19054 0.44 0.657 
Other -11.641 19.35981 -0.6 0.548 
None -25.066 19.99512 -1.25 0.21 
Housing tenure (ref=owner)     
Social tenant -13.303 12.37974 -1.07 0.283 
Private tenant -7.567 12.18872 -0.62 0.535 
Income deciles (ref = low)    
2 -18.15 19.4768 -0.93 0.351 
3 -7.767 18.99008 -0.41 0.683 
4 -5.098 20.06727 -0.25 0.799 
5 -23.228 20.28709 -1.14 0.252 
6 -3.944 20.59921 -0.19 0.848 
7 -7.883 21.1895 -0.37 0.71 
8 -8.104 20.55839 -0.39 0.693 
9 13.896 21.85725 0.64 0.525 
Highest 37.307 21.48991 1.74 0.083 
     N = 22,725 observations from 2,525 individuals (complete cases). 
Significance levels: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01, *** = 0.001. 
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fitted support amounts for each gender in Figure 6 shows that the lines for women are 
consistently higher than those for men, but the gap between them is quite small. One can also see 
that there is no difference at all in the slope of the lines. So women start from a slightly higher 
point, but men and women change their support amounts in precisely the same way as parental 
incomes change. We note that the size of the gender gap was similar in the American studies, but 
in the U.S. there was also a small difference in slope: there, the gender gap in fitted support 
amounts was greater at higher father incomes than at lower ones (Ellman, et. al. 2009).   
 
Figure 6 Child support judgments (fitted values) for women and men. 
 
In each case the higher of the pair of lines is for women, and the lower line for men. 
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Those reporting they had paid support favoured support amounts no different from the rest of the 
respondents, but those reporting they had received child support favoured support amounts that 
(perhaps surprisingly) were about £40 lower.21 Their lower amounts were still usually higher, 
however, than the amounts set by the CSA formula, and they still varied with both father and 
mother income and thus produced the usual fanning line pattern. (Note that the lower amounts for 
those who at some time had received support are independent of any income effect, as household 
income is also included in the model.) We have no ready explanation for this result, but it is 
important to note that non-resident fathers, and lone mothers, who do not say they had paid or 
received child support are not included in these figures, making them more difficult to interpret.22  
 
Our respondents can be sorted into three levels of education: those with university 
degrees, those with secondary school qualifications (or equivalent) without university degrees, 
and those who claimed no formal qualifications of any kind. Other things being equal, university 
graduates proposed child support amounts that were around £60 higher than the middle group and 
£82 higher the least educated group. Figure 7 compares the university graduates to the least 
educated group. It shows the amounts that university graduates propose for mothers earning 
£1,500 and £2,200 per month were very similar to the amounts the least educated group propose 
for mothers earning £900 and £1,500, respectively. Simply looking at Figure 7 shows once again, 
however, that the slopes of the lines for university graduates, and for the least educated, are quite 
similar: while graduates propose higher absolute amounts, the two groups’ adjustments of 
support amounts, in response to parental income changes, are quite similar. 
 
  
Comment [IE1]: Aren’t thjese fitted 
amounts, not raw averages? 
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Figure 7 Child support judgments (fitted values) of university graduates and those 
with no formal credentials. 
 
 
As one would expect, graduates’ incomes are on average higher, but the higher support 
amounts they favour are also independent of any income effect. Indeed, and perhaps surprisingly, 
respondents’ incomes were unrelated to their child support judgments. Other characteristics we 
examined, but which also had no effect on respondents’ support judgments, were age and having 
a child in one’s household. Table 3 also shows there was no statistically significant effect of 
either housing tenure or party political identity. Although the analysis is not included in Table 3, 
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amounts than the main group asked the amount they thought the law should require (N of  
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‘force’ a recalcitrant parent to pay. But how much support should the government require, and 
just what factors should matter in deciding on that amount? The data we present here paint a 
fairly clear picture of the British public’s answers to these questions for the case we put to them: 
divorced parents with one child, an eight year old boy, who lives his mother but sees his father 
during the week and usually stays with him one night at the weekend. The fanning line pattern 
displayed in Figures 1 (the raw data means) and 5 (the HLM fitted amounts) shows the public 
believes the amount of support that the law should require the father to pay: 
 
1. Should depend on both the father’s income and the mother’s income (since there are three 
lines). 
2. Should increase with the father’s income, all else being equal (since the lines slope up). 
3. Should decline as the mother’s income increases, all else being equal, not only in pounds 
but also as a percentage of the father’s income (since the three maternal lines are not 
parallel, reflecting the fact that the lower the maternal income, the steeper is the line’s 
slope). 
4. Should continue to rise with the father’s income beyond the point needed to ensure the 
child is not in poverty, thus permitting the child access to amenities as well (since the 
lines continue to rise with paternal income through the highest paternal income we asked 
about, for all three maternal incomes). One expects there is some level of affluence 
beyond which the public believes the support amount need not rise, but if so, that level 
was not reached in any of the cases we put to them. 
 
Our confidence that these statements accurately portray the public’s views has several 
bases. First, asking respondents to decide specific cases provides a more stable window into the 
principles they believe should apply than does asking about those principles directly. People are 
often unable to construct abstract statements of principle that accurately capture their intuitions 
about the fair way to decide concrete cases. One reason for that difficulty is that abstract 
propositions typically contain ambiguities in their application to specific cases. Inferring 
respondents’ favoured principles from systematic patterns in their case decisions can eliminate 
ambiguities. That does not mean that what people say about principles has no meaning or 
importance. Indeed, the American studies that inspired this project found a clear, logical, and 
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systematic relationship between the respondents’ ratings of the principles and their decisions in 
the cases (Ellman, Braver, and MacCoun, 2012), results that a forthcoming article in this series 
will show are largely replicated in British context. In both the American and British studies, 
however, the respondents decided cases first and rated principles afterward, and a later American 
study found reason to believe their case judgments were more stable than their ratings of the 
principles. That study (Braver, Ellman, and MacCoun 2014) compared the responses of two 
groups of respondents. Both decided cases and rated child support principles, in questions quite 
similar to those put to our British respondents, but the sequence for one group was the reverse of  
the other’s: one first decided the cases, while the other first rated the principles. The question was 
whether the sequence affected their choices in either task. The answer was that the sequence 
affected the respondents’ ratings of the child support principles, but not their decisions in the 
cases. Those who first worked through the cases rated several principles differently than those 
who rated principles before seeing the cases, but there was no difference in the way respondents 
in the two groups decided the cases. Those results suggest people are more likely to conform 
their views about principles to their case decisions, than the other way around. These findings are 
consistent with earlier studies others conducted about other legal domains (Holyoak and Simon, 
1999).24 So we believe the pattern of our respondents’ case decisions provides the best single 
window into the principles they believe the law should reflect, although the full story would 
include the views about principles held by respondents who have also considered cases.  
It is important that the four principles we infer from the respondents’ case decisions are 
not dependent on the absolute levels of support they favour so much as on how they adjust 
support levels in response to changes in parental incomes. Viewing the data graphically, it is the 
slope of the lines, especially in relation to one another, from which these principles are inferred, 
rather than their heights. And it is just this pattern of slopes–the fanning line pattern seen in 
Figures 1 and 5–that is particularly robust. As explained above in Sections 3 and 4, not only is 
there reason to be confident that a repeated sampling of the entire British public would largely 
reproduce both Figures, it is also true that the basic fanning line pattern is reproduced if one looks 
only at demographic subgroups within the sample. Our key results, in another words, are not very 
dependent on whom we ask. One might still wonder, however, how much it depends on exactly 
what we ask and how we ask it.  
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Data from the American studies, as well as other data collected in this study on which we 
will report in future articles, confirm that it does not depend much at all. Our respondents were all 
asked to set child support amount (across the same nine income combinations) for a second 
family situation in addition to the one we report on in this article. The 2,984 respondents were 
divided into 11 groups for this purpose, each group being asked about a different second family.  
Forthcoming articles will discuss in detail how the factual changes in the family situations 
affected our respondents’ favoured support amounts, but for now we observe that the basic 
fanning line pattern was replicated in all these additional cases as well. Even more compelling 
evidence is offered by the American studies that developed the methodology borrowed for this 
project. Apart from one interesting difference in detail (which we address below), the answers of 
American respondents to essentially identical questions25 produced the identical fanning line 
pattern, not only in the original American experiment equivalent to this one (Ellman, Braver, and 
MacCoun, 2009), but repeatedly, across eight different variations that might be expected to, and 
usually did, change our respondents’ preference as to the absolute support levels. (Braver, 
Ellman, and MacCoun, 2014; Ellman and Braver, 2011).  Some variations involved different 
facts about the family (such as specifying that there are two children, not one, or that the parents 
were not married) and some involved differences in how the question is framed (such as asking 
respondents about fifteen different income combinations rather than nine, or asking them to 
choose a support amount from an array of possibilities, rather than asking for a free-form 
response, or by wording the question to emphasize that the payment is for the child, rather than 
that it is paid to the mother). In some (but not all) cases, the change produced best fit lines that 
were higher or lower, or slopes that were steeper or flatter, but the fanning line pattern persisted 
across all the cases, whether or not they exhibited these other changes. 
In sum, the fanning line pattern found in this study is robust across demographic groups 
within the UK, across national boundaries, across population samples within the U.S., and across 
changes in either the facts of the question, or the way it is put. We are therefore confident the 
fanning line pattern would be replicated again with repeated samples of the British public, and 
therefore also confident the British public supports the four principles set out above that we infer 
from this pattern.  
That said, we must also note one respect in which the UK responses differed from the 
American. Respondents in both countries would require fathers to pay a higher percentage of 
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their income in child support when the mother’s income is lower—the very reason why the three 
lines in Figures 1 and 5 are not parallel but fan out. But as noted above, the British public also 
favours requiring fathers to pay a higher percentage of their income in child support when their 
income is higher. American respondents, by contrast, tended to propose support amounts that 
were a relatively constant percentage of the father’s income, for any given maternal income. 
Americans thus favoured rates that went up as maternal income declined, but did not change very 
much with paternal income. The effect, visually, is that while the results from both countries 
form a fanning line pattern, the slopes of the lines are steeper in the UK than in the U.S. This 
difference between the two countries persists across all the variations in the questions we have 
just noted, and would seem to reflect a greater appetite for income redistribution among the 
British than among Americans.  
The conclusion seems thus inescapable that there are important features of current as well 
as proposed UK law that are inconsistent with the British public’s firmly held values. The public 
believes the government should enforce the child support obligations of fathers at levels that are 
higher when mother income is lower, and that rise with father income well past the point at which 
the child escapes any risk of poverty. This latter finding is buttressed by the British public’s 
preference (unlike the American public’s) for support schedules that require fathers to pay a 
higher percentage of their income in child support when their income is higher, not just the 
higher amount one would get from applying a constant percentage. It thus seems clear they 
believe that children of higher-income fathers should enjoy some of the amenities the father is 
capable of providing, but which the mother is not. It is reasonable to wonder, then, why the 
British law is configured as it is. Answers, if not justifications, may perhaps be found in its 
history. Difficulties with the initial British support guidelines caused policymakers to make 
changes that put a premium on simplicity and ease of administration. Those are both fair 
concerns to be sure, but the reforms may have been too single-minded in pursuing them. The 
mother’s income is if anything easier to obtain than the father’s, and thus including it in the 
formula should not itself create important administrative challenges. Consider too the common 
assumption that guidelines should be based on the ‘cost’ of children, which the parents should 
presumably share. If one must fix support levels without considering both parents’ incomes, then 
one has no basis for departing from a default assumption that the parents should devote the same 
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percentage of their respective incomes to the children. But the implicit assumption of such a rule, 
that the mother is just as capable of providing for the child as the father, will usually be wrong. 
Finally, the very focus on ‘cost’, while intuitively appealing, reflects conceptual 
confusion and is itself ultimately incoherent. One cannot say what a child costs without first 
deciding what to buy for her. To think of the child support obligation in ‘cost’ terms thus 
presumes that the question of what to buy has already been decided. Moreover, framing the 
question as ‘what does a child cost’ implies a single answer for all children. ‘What does a child 
cost’ is quite a different question than ‘what does this child cost’. To many it suggests that what 
is called for is an estimate of the cost of providing a minimally adequate living standard that we 
would hope no child would fall below. That kind of cost estimate seems appropriate if the 
question is fixing the level of a public benefit meant to keep children from poverty.26 But is it an 
appropriate basis for a child support law? Only if one believes the father’s responsibility is no 
greater than the state’s, and the law’s purpose is limited to requiring him to pay just enough to 
keep his children from suffering for lack of necessities. But that conception is obviously 
inconsistent with the public’s views that the child support laws should require fathers to pay for 
amenities when they can afford to. It is indeed inconsistent with any support guideline, including 
the UK’s, that increases the required support level with rising parental income, unless the 
guideline caps support amounts at very low levels.27  In fact, neither the UK guideline, nor any 
American guideline, is based on what children ‘cost’ in this sense. They are instead based on 
estimates of what parents in intact families spend on their children, and the guidelines go up with 
parental income because parents who have more money spend more on their children.28 
Yet translating estimates of parental expenditures on children in intact families, into 
required support amounts in a child support guideline applied to separated families, is a tricky 
business involving many policy choices. (Ellman and Ellman, 2008; Ellman, 2013). It requires 
more than arithmetic. That is one reason why child support amounts vary, for example, among 
the American states: one state’s formula may call for a support amount that is twice that which an 
adjoining state would impose for an identical case, although the discrepancy might be different 
for a second case (Pirog, Grieshop, and Elliot, 2003; Morgan and Lino, 1999). So the formulas 
vary within the U.S. as well as between the U.S. and the UK. The mechanical and precise nature 
of the support calculation creates the illusion that the numbers reflect some objective, scientific 
fact, when they actually reflect important policy choices about which people may differ.  
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The most basic policy choice is deciding what counts as an ‘expenditure on children’. The 
standard method (Ellman and Ellman 2008) imagines a hypothetical childless couple at some 
income level, and then asks how much more they would need to spend to maintain their living 
standard when a child or children are added to their household. But additional expenditures 
occasioned by the new child do not, of course, include things the parents also spent money on 
when childless, even though many of these continuing expenditures benefit the newly added 
children. So the cost of any changes in housing required to maintain the same living standard–
perhaps, for example, the additional cost of a larger home–counts as an expenditure on children, 
but the base cost of having a home in the first place does not. Such a system thus assumes the 
father should share, for example, in the additional cost of the extra bedroom, but not in the cost of 
the kitchen, bathroom, or living room, since the childless couples already had those. Additions to 
the food or clothing budget are counted, but not the cost of a car (except to the extent it is greater 
after children than before, which is not especially likely).  
In short, the intact family makes many expenditures that confer benefits on children that 
are not included in the standard child expenditure estimates upon which most support guidelines 
are based, because they are ‘joint expenditures’ that benefit everyone in the household.29 The 
necessary premise of such a calculation is that the parents are equally capable, after separation, of 
providing the foundational living standard that the intact family enjoyed before separation, so that 
the child support system need only address how parents should share the additional expenditures 
the couple incurs by having a child. But where the mother earns less than the father, this premise 
is wrong. Providing her with the father’s share of the cost of an extra bedroom does not help 
much if, now on her own, she cannot afford the rest of the home to which it is attached. A 
spousal maintenance order, if there were one, could deal with that discrepancy; a child support 
schedule based on estimates of ‘child-only’ expenditures, excluding joint expenditures that 
benefit children along with other household members, cannot. 
When the two parents have relatively similar incomes, basing support amounts on child-
only expenditures is not very problematic: in that case the parents face similar financial 
challenges from the separation, children aside. If they are in the same situation with respect to 
paying for the foundational household expenditures, it may make sense to focus exclusively on 
the additional expenditures occasioned by the children. But as the two parents’ incomes become 
more disparate, the situation changes. The lower-income parent suffers a more precipitous drop in 
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living standard from the separation than does the higher-income parent. And as the lower-income 
parent is most often also the mother with whom the child primarily lives, that steeper fall 
becomes a matter that the child support law should reasonably be expected to address. Of course, 
income transfers between parents through the child support system are not the only potential 
source of assistance for the low-income mother, and can in any event provide little real help in 
the common case in which the father is also low-income. Benefits provided through public 
programmes necessarily play a critical role. But they are alone often inadequate, and are not 
intended to and in fact cannot provide children of higher-income fathers with the amenities these 
children were accustomed to and some of which, at least, their fathers are still able to provide 
after separation.  
A system requiring the father to pay his share of just the child-only expenditures might be 
explained as maintaining the status quo: he is then contributing, after separation, precisely the 
same amount toward his children that he did before separation. But it is the same amount of only 
the additional ‘child-only’ expenditures. He retains all he contributed to the foundational joint 
expenditures, even though these must be duplicated after separation when the parents need two 
kitchens rather than one. In effect, this system shields the higher-income father from contributing 
his share to the duplicated costs that are the inevitable consequence of separation, leaving the 
lower-income mother to bear them on her own. 
The differences between current British policy, and the policy favoured by the British 
public, is summarized in Table 4. 
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Table Four.  Comparison of the public’s policy preferences with the policy choices 
implemented by UK law. 
 
The UK Public’s Policy The UK Public Policy 
Low-income mother receives more support 
than higher-income mother, thus helping her 
with basic living expenses 
Low-income mother left on her own with 
respect to basic living expenses.   
High-income father pays a higher rate than 
low-income father 
High-income father pays same rate as low-
income father (UK), often less in U.S. 
High-income father contributes enough to 
provide some amenities 
Amenities in mother’s household depend 
primarily on mother’s income 
Parents share the cost of separation Father is protected from sharing the extra costs 
created by separation 
 
In sum, the intuitions of the British public offer important insights into the design of the 
child support calculation, insights that the current UK law’s history may have led its draughtsmen 
to miss. The mother’s income matters, and, especially when parental incomes are disparate, more 
should probably be expected from the higher-income father than the law currently requires. That 
is certainly the view of the British public, and it appears to be a view to which policymakers 
ought to give considerable attention. The importance of this point is of course connected to the 
role that the statutory formula plays in the system. One consistent difference between the U.S. 
and the UK is the formula’s legal effect. In the U.S. child support is always set in a judicial order, 
and the judge must justify, in writing, any deviation of the order from the formula amount. The 
parents’ agreement on the deviation is, in principle, alone insufficient to justify it.30 (So, for 
example, more than the parents’ agreement is needed to justify a zero order, or one for only a 
token amount). In contrast, while the UK formula applies to child support arrangements made 
under the statutory system, even now more than half of child support payments are based on 
‘voluntary agreements’ to which the formula does not apply – parents may choose to consult it, to 
apply it to their own cases, or to ignore it, or indeed they may negotiate entirely unaware of its 
existence. There is no official verification or accreditation of their agreements.31 It also remains 
true that many of those potentially ‘entitled’ to receive child support receive nothing, whether 
through lax enforcement or lack of applying for it. The importance of the formula will decline if 
even more parents are shifted into ‘family-based’ arrangements to which it will not apply. Yet 
that move would only increase the discrepancy between the law and the public’s values. As our 
earlier article reported, the public strongly favours government enforcement of the child support 
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obligation. That finding is fortified by the data we report here, which show strong public support 
for a revised formula that would require higher-income fathers to provide more support than the 
current formula provides. 
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1 The child support system is gender-neutral – a non-resident mother is obliged to pay child support to a 
father with care. However, over nine cases in ten involve a resident mother and a non-resident father. For ease of 
exposition, we therefore often refer to the PWC (parent with care) as the mother, and the NRP (non-resident parent) 
as the father. 
2 Department for Work and Pensions, The Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission and the Child 
Support Agency’s Operational Improvement Plan, The Third Report of the Work and Pensions Committee Session 
2009-10 [2010], HC118, at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmworpen/118/118.pdf. 
3 National Audit Office Child Support Agency- Implementation of the Child Support Reforms, [2006] 
National Audit Office, London: The Stationery Office, HC 1174, available at: www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2006/06/05061174.pdf. 
4 From July 2013 the new formula based on gross income applies to applicants with two or more children – 
for legal aspects see http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1860/body/made and for broader discussion see 
http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed113401. 
5 Some sources of income, such as payments from pensions, are deducted before arriving at the relevant 
taxable gross income for calculating child support amounts. 
6 The gross income schedule will assess the father 12%, 16%, and 19% for one, two, or three or more 
children, respectively, for incomes of up to £800 per week, dropping to 9%, 12% and 15% for amounts above £800 
per week. This reflects (very roughly) the point at which the marginal income tax rate increases from 20% to 40%. 
7 Department for Work and Pensions, Recovering child support: routes to responsibility, [2006] Cm 6894, 
London: The Stationery Office, available at: www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/henshaw-complete22-7.pdf. 
8 ‘Income’ was defined for the respondents by this sentence: ‘By income, I mean their entire income after 
tax, including any wages, tax credits, state benefits and any other money coming into the household.’ 
9 These figures were designed to be at the lower end, roughly in the middle, and towards the top 20%, for 
the kinds of individuals discussed. So the lowest father income is based on full-time work at the national minimum 
wage, whilst the lowest mother’s income was based on the level of means-tested social assistance (‘Income Support’ 
in the UK) plus a low level of means-tested support for rent and local taxes. The middle income figure for each 
parent was the gender-appropriate median wage, and the high income figure was around the 80th percentile wage for 
each gender. 
10 We note that respondents were divided randomly into 11 subgroups; each subgroup was asked an 
additional set of questions employing the same nine income combinations, but with a different set of facts about the 
family’s situation. Data from these additional vignettes will be presented in future papers. 
11 For this group, the last three sentences in the first paragraph of the question as set forth in the box were 
replaced by these two sentences: ‘But the question is how much maintenance is fair to expect the other parent to pay. 
There are no right or wrong answers on this. We just want to know the amount you think is fair.’ The second 
paragraph was replaced by a different paragraph with only these two sentences: ‘I’m going to tell you about several 
different situations, and ask you how much maintenance you believe it is fair to expect the parent to pay in each 
case.’ 
12 Respondents answer a series of different modules, some of which are answered by one or two-thirds of 
the sample.  All respondents were asked three modules about public spending and social security; transport, and child 
support. However, some also answered on end of life care, disability, or health. General sections, asked of all 
respondents, dealt with classifying respondents, job details, certain behaviours (e.g. newspaper readership) and 
attitudes (e.g. political support).  
13 Only 1988 and 1992 have been missed out. 
14 There were 264 additional interviews in the smaller group asked to state the support amount that was fair, 
rather than the amount they thought the law should require. 
15 Obviously, this view was not held by every respondent. In fact, while 73% adjusted their child support 
amounts when the mother’s income changed, 27% did not. By comparison, only 6% did not adjust their support 
amount when the father’s income changed. Both ‘didn’t change’ figures (27% and 6%) include the 3.5% who gave 
the same answer to all nine questions, no matter either parent’s income. And that 3.5% includes the .5% who would 
not require any child support in any case.   
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16 Of course, one cannot assume this pattern would continue indefinitely through the very highest paternal 
incomes. From these data we cannot tell the point at which our respondents might ‘top off’ their required 
maintenance payments, other than that it is higher than the highest incomes we asked about. 
17 Here, and elsewhere, the comparison is to the CSA 2003 formula. 
18 Alternative rules apply below a gross income of £200 per week (£867 per month) and there is a ceiling set 
at £3,000 per week (£13,000 per month) where more income does not affect the calculated maintenance. 
19 Correlations range from -1 to +1.  A correlation of zero means two variables are completely unrelated to 
one another—knowing the value of one gives you no information about the value of the other.  A correlation of +1 
means that the two variables move up and down in value in perfect synchrony: every time one moves up X units, the 
other moves up Y units, so that you could predict a change in either one, knowing the other, with perfect accuracy. A 
correlation of -1 is an equally perfect predictor, but in this case one variable moves down X units every time the 
other goes up Y units. The positive correlations here are quite high, signifying strong predictive value.  
20 This phenomenon has been seen in other domains as well when citizens are asked to make judgments on 
matters for which absolute norms are not readily accessible, and has been called ‘coherent arbitrariness’ (Ariely, 
Lowenstein, and Prelac, 2003). For example, studies have found a high level of agreement among jurors as to 
relative culpability of tort defendants against whom punitive damages are claimed, and the relative severity of the 
appropriate punishment each should suffer, but great variability in the absolute amount of the appropriate dollar 
award. (Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein, 1998). Analogous results are found for jurors in tort cases asked to fix 
damages for pain and suffering (Wissler, Hart, and Saks, 1999). 
21 We originally analyzed separately the effect of having received or paid child support, and of having been 
an NRP or a PWC, but models would not run with both sets of terms included because of the strong overlap between 
them (e.g., having been an NRP is strongly correlated with having paid child support).  
22 There is reason to guess that many fathers who have not paid support also do not self-identify as NRPs. 
Surveys typically find about half as many NRP fathers as one would expect, given the number of self-identified lone 
mothers. One might expect the support amounts proposed by those experienced with the current support rules to be 
be closer to the CSA amount (and thus lower) because of a tendency to accept familiar rules, whatever they are, as 
appropriate. We know from the American studies, for example, that there is a significant anchoring effect when 
respondents asked to choose the support amount they believe fair are told that ‘some courts’ would order a specified 
support amount, even though ‘other courts’ differ. Such information shifts respondents’ judgments towards the 
amount they are told ‘some courts’ would order, whether that anchor is higher or lower than the mean of respondents 
given no anchor point. (Braver, MacCoun, and Ellman, 2008).  But we cannot explain why that anchoring would be 
seen here for those who had received support, but not for those who had paid it.  
23 The fitted amounts for the “fair to pay” group were about £23 less than for those who were asked our 
standard question, a difference not much more than the difference between men and women (£20), and considerably 
smaller than the difference between graduates and those with a lower level of qualification (about £60). The fair to 
pay group had an overall mean of £355, with a 95% confidence interval of £340 to £370 (which roughly means there 
is a 95% chance the true mean lies between these points; for a more precise explanation of a confidence interval, see 
http://handbook.cochrane.org/chapter_12/12_4_1_confidence_intervals.htm) while for the other respondents the 
mean was £378, with a 95% confidence interval, £372 to £383, that is smaller because of the much larger N. One 
might have expected any difference, if there was one, to have been in the opposite direction, with some respondents 
perhaps believing there were philosophical or practical problems with the forcing fathers to pay all that one might 
believe a father, in fairness, should pay.  We have no idea why any respondents would believe the law should require 
fathers to pay more than the respondent thought fair. Of course, we do not have a within-subjects comparison; 
respondents were not asked both the amount they thought fair and the amount they thought the law should pay.  Our 
comparison is rather between the small group asked about fairness and the larger one asked about what the law 
should require. Had we asked some respondents about both, thus focusing their attention on the difference between 
the questions, we might not have found any difference. We cannot know. For this reason, as well as the fact that the 
difference was small, barely achieving statistical significance, we do not comment further on this result. 
24 It is also consistent with the assumptions underlying the classic American law school teaching method, in 
which students who identify a principle they believe explains the result in a particular case are then challenged to 
refine it by presenting them with a new case in which their initial formulation seems to call for an unjust result. Had 
we given our respondents the opportunity to reconsider both of their responses, our respondents might have adopted 
the process philosophers call reflective equilibrium (Daniels, 1996), in which they go back and forth between cases 
and principles, their answers to each helping to refine their views on the other. 
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25 This study recast the questions used in the U.S. only to achieve UK cultural equivalence. 
26 For a study of this kind in the UK, developed just for this sort of purpose, see Donald Hirsch, The Cost of 
a Child in 2013 (Child and Poverty Action Group, London, 2013), available at http://www.cpag.org.uk/content/cost-
child-2013.  
27 This study found no evidence of support for such caps in our respondents’ proposed amounts, as they 
would require the highest-earning fathers we asked about, at £3000 a month, to pay a higher percentage of their 
income in support than they asked of lower-income fathers. While the American respondents did tend toward 
requiring fathers to pay a flat percentage of their income for any given maternal income level, rather than a 
percentage that rose with paternal income, they maintained such a flat percentage through the highest paternal 
incomes put to them, which reached $12,000 a month net of taxes 
28 This is clear in the case of American guidelines; see Ellman and Ellman (2008). The basis of the UK 
guidelines is rather more mysterious. See note 25, infra.  
29 For a detailed examination of how this works in setting American guidelines, see Ellman (2004). The 
basis of the current UK schedule is less transparent. It appears, however, that while the method may not be identical, 
it relies on the same key assumption that one should count only expenditures that benefit the child only, excluding 
joint expenditures that benefit all members of the household including the child. The relevant government report 
states that 'the proposed base rate of 15 per cent of their income is roughly half the average that an intact two-parent 
family spends on a child'. DSS, A new contract for welfare: children's rights and parents' responsibilities, Cm 4349, 
London, DSS (1999), at page 9. For this figure, the report cites Middleton, Ashworth and Braithwaite, Small 
fortunes: spending on children, childhood poverty and parental sacrifice, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York (1997).  
This study involved a survey of families, both intact and lone-parent, who were asked about particular categories of 
possible expenditures on children, such as food, clothing, nappies, Christmas presents, etc. There are no joint 
expenditures among the items parents were asked about, just expenditures on items solely for the children. Whether 
the total of these ‘child-only’ expenditures equaled thirty percent of the income of the reporting families is less clear; 
the published study itself offers no measure of that kind at all, whether 30 per cent or some other figure. Most 
puzzling, however, is the logic of the assertion in the government report: if the child support schedule is to be based 
on an estimate that parents in intact families together spend 30 percent of their joint income on their children, one 
would expect the schedule to require the father to continue contributing 30 percent of his income after the separation. 
The DSS report provides no further explanation.  
The 15 per cent figure endorsed by the report is applied to net income; the current plan is to change it to the 
roughly equivalent figure of 12 per cent of gross income. Compare Wisconsin, which like the UK (but unlike most 
American states) calculates child support on the basis of the father’s income alone. Its rate for one child is 17 per 
cent of gross income. See http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/bcs/order/guidelines.htm. That is nearly half-again the UK rate.  
30 The basic federal rule all states must follow is set out in 45 C.F.R. §302.56. It requires all states to have 
guidelines that set the specific dollar amount of a child support in all cases, and goes on to provide that the order 
must be for that amount unless there is a ‘written finding or specific finding on the record of a judicial or 
administrative proceeding…that the [guideline amount] would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case,…as 
determined under criteria established by the State. Such criteria must take into consideration the best interests of the 
child. Findings that rebut the guidelines shall state the amount of support that would have been required under the 
guidelines and include a justification of why the order varies from the guidelines.’  
31 Another difference is that Federal law in the U.S. requires the court to couple every child support order 
with a wage assignment order to the obligor’s employer. Ellman et al, 2010:580-581. When the father is employed 
the formula’s impact is thus inescapable, because he never sees the money it calls for. His employer must instead 
send that portion of his wages directly to the local child support enforcement agency, which then disburses it to the 
mother (assuming the state does not have first claim to it, as reimbursement for payments to the mother under the 
American welfare scheme). There is no such scheme in the UK.  
